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The authors report the second in a series of experiments on recognition as a
dependent variable in the study of learning and forgetting of television comn^ercials.
They investigate the impact of time since exposure, commercial length, and com-
mercial repetition on recognition and unaided recall scores. The results indicote that
recognition scores are not indiscriminately high, as commonly is argued, and that
they do decline with time, contrary to what often is assumed. The data, in fact,
show that recognition scores are more sensitive and more discriminating than, and
covary with, unaided recall scores. The evidence indicates they warrant more con-
sideration by advertisers.
Recognition Versus Recall as Measures of
Television Commercial Forgetting
Measuring the effectiveness of advertising is a central
research interest of both academic and industry research-
ers (Leckenby and Plununer 1983; Ostlund 1978; Stew-
art, Furse, and Kozak 1983). When effectiveness is mea-
sured in terms of leaming and memory, recall and
recognition are common dependent variables (Stewart et
al. 1985).
We report the second in a series of experiments on
recognition as a dependent variable in the study of the
learning and forgetting of television commercials. The
first experiment (Singh and Rothschild 1983a) studied
learning curves as a function of repetition levels, com-
mercial length, and number of distractors; the second ex-
periment examined forgetting curves as a function of
repetition, message length, and the passage of time. Both
studies considered the virtues of recognition as a mea-
sure of memory, and its sensitivity and discriminability.
The studies also compared recognition with the more
popular measure of recall. The two experiments were
undertaken in response to the ever-increasing disen-
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chantment of advertising practitioners with recall as a
measure of leaming (Krugman 1985; Zielske 1982).'
The fundamental difference in the two measures is that
for recall the individual must describe the stimulus, which
is not present, whereas for recognition the stimulus, which
is shown to the subject, must merely be identified as
having been seen or heard previously (Bettman 1979).
Generally it is easier to show a memory trace through a
recognition test than through a recall test. As a result,
developing leaming to the point where recall can be
achieved may be unnecessary if a recognition level of
leaming is sufficient. The potential implications for me-
dia planning and advertising budgeting are important be-
cause the cost of achieving an adequate level of leaming
is much lower for recognition than for recall.
RECOGNITION VERSUS RECALL
Though recognition has been the dominant method used
to measure memory of print ads, it has not had the same
level of acceptance in broadcast media. Recall measures
seem to be popular in broadcast media despite several
associated methodological problems (Clancy, Ostlund,
and Wyner 1979; Haskins 1964); they tend to be very
stringent and can mask the amount of actual memory
(Zielske 1982).
'As many of the issues related to the performance of recognition
versus recall scores have been discussed at length elsewhere, our
treatment is brief. Interested readers are referred to Singh and Roth-
schild (1983a) for fuller discussion.
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Whether to choose recognition or recall as a measure
of leaming of broadcast ads should be dictated in part
by the way in which the information is to be used in
brand choice decisions. Bettman (1979) believes, for ex-
ample, that because many brand choice decisions are made
at a retail location, particularly for low involvement con-
venience goods, people only need a recognition level of
leaming because the buying situation is replete with cues
that act as aids to memory. In contrast, if the decision
is made at home in isolation, a recall level of leaming
may be needed because most choices are not physically
present in the home for examination. Such would be the
situation with high involvement or high brand loyalty
products.
Though recognition may be suitable for assessing the
memory of low involvement television commercials, its
lack of popularity in broadcast media may be due to sev-
eral causes. First, recognition has been criticized as being
less sensitive than recall in that recognition scores are
substantially higher than recall scores and can be "in-
discriminately high" (Haber 1970; Krugman 1979;
Shepard and Chang 1967). Singh and Rothschild (1983a),
for example, found recognition scores were significantly
higher than recall scores in all cases. In fact, recognition
scores exceeded recall scores even when the exposure
treatment for recall used more repetitions of the same
message or used longer messages. The fact that recog-
nition scores are typically higher than recall scores seems
to imply more sensitivity because leaming exists that could
not be shown via recall. Second, advertising recognition
scores do not seem to decline with time whereas they
should be sensitive to memory loss (Lucas 1960), an is-
sue explored here.
Another criticism of recognition tests is that they can-
not discriminate as well as recall tests because of their
insensitivity and resulting ceiling effects. However, Singh
and Rothschild (1983a) found that when several stimuli
were used, the recognition test showed greater variance
and fewer extreme scores than did recall.
A final issue related to recall and recognition is whether
they measure the same processes of leaming. Two gen-
eral theories are used in psychology to compare recog-
nition and recall. One model, called "strength theory"
or "threshold theory," posits that recall and recognition
are measuring the same underlying memory construct but
that the recognition of an item requires a lower threshold
or strength of familiarity than does recall (Kintsch 1970).
A second, more dominant, theoretical model is the
"dual-process hypothesis" (Anderson and Bower 1972),
which holds that recall involves two steps—memory
search and recognition. To recall an item, a subject first
generates a number of prospective candidates for recall
during the search process and then decides, through rec-
ognition, that one of them is the stimulus item. The dual-
process hypothesis thus assumes that recognition is a
subprocess of recall. Anderson and Bower also have pro-
posed a modified dual-process hypothesis suggesting that
recognition and recall involve very similar processes. More
specifically, they propose that recognition, too, may in-
volve both search and decision processes (see Mandler
1980 for a detailed review). The empirical evidence sup-
ports the notion that recall and recognition scores do
covary (Zinkhan, Locander, and Lee 1986).
OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE
The objectives in the first study (Singh and Rothschild
1983a) were to develop a discriminating recognition
measure and to investigate whether recognition could re-
veal adequately that leaming had occurred. These ob-
jectives were met in an experiment where the basic con-
tent of the advertising stimuli was kept constant and the
tests of discrimination were distinguished by the number
of repetitions and the lengths ofthe messages. One result
was the demonstration of recognition-based leaming
curves based on several levels of repetition.
In the study reported here the primary objective was
to investigate forgetting curves resulting from the pas-
sage of time between stimulus exposure and recognition.
This issue is an important one, because historically rec-
ognition measures have been criticized for their lack of
decline across delays in memory tests. In 1956, the Ad-
vertising Research Foundation commissioned a study en-
titled, "A Study of Printed Advertising Rating Methods"
(the PARM study). The PARM study found that memory
for the ads, as measured by recognition tests, remained
stable over a 2-week period. In contrast, recall scores
showed significant decline over the same period. This
fmding was seen as very damaging for recognition test-
ing procedures; researchers such as Lucas (1960) and
Wells (1964) argued that because no decline was ob-
served in the recognition scores, recognition was not a
measure of memory per se. Advertisers became even more
reluctant to use recognition measures for assessing leam-
ing effects of television commercials when later studies
in psychology by Shepard and Chang (1967) and Haber
(1970) showed that the human mind could recognize
thousands of pictures very accurately after a significant
length of time.
Though the belief that recognition scores do not de-
cline over time persists, there are at least two potential
explanations for the observed nondecline. One expla-
nation reflects the way recognition tests typically are ad-
ministered. In advertising, almost all recognition testing
is done with yes/no tests whereby the respondent is shown
a series of ads one at a time and is asked to respond
"yes" if he or she remembers seeing the ad and "no" if
he or she does not (Singh and Cole 1985). However, the
validity of yes/no recognition tests is questionable. One
of the major problems in such tests is false positives that
artificially raise the recognition scores. Several studies
have shown that a large percentage of respondents claim
recognition of bogus ads (ads respondents could not have
seen before) when real ads also are being tested (see Singh
and Cole for a review of these studies).
The tendency to "recognize" ads irrespective of prior
exposure is likely to be due to several factors that affect
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ad recognition scores, such as eagemess to please the
interviewer, hesitation to appear ignorant, the tendency
of people to deny socially undesirable traits and to admit
to socially desirable ones, and a generalized trait of some
respondents that leads them to overclaim (Clancy, Ost-
lund, and Wyner 1979; Lucas and Britt 1963). In sum,
subjects' response tendencies can affect their claimed
recognition of ads.
Another potential explanation for the observed non-
decline of recognition scores is theory based. Actually
there are two conceptual arguments. One argument holds
that recognition memory is generally greater for pictures
than for words (Haber 1970; Shepard and Chang 1967;
Standing 1973) and is greatest for faces (Deffenbacher,
Carr, and Leu 1981). This difference in memory per-
formance may be because the intemal representation of
a picture contains different kinds of information than does
the intemal representation of a word (Kosslyn and Pom-
erantz 1977; Paivio 1971, 1977; Shepard and Podgomy
1978) and faces may be a special class of pictorial ma-
terial represented in a third memory system (Carey and
Diamond 1977).
Another conceptual argument holds that there is a hy-
pothetical memory threshold for recognition that is lower
than the hypothetical threshold for recall. Therefore, the
strength of a given memory trace may be below the re-
call threshold, but above the recognition threshold. If the
material has been overleamed in relation to the threshold
of recognition (or recall), the indicants of recognition (or
recall) are not sensitive to early retention losses.
Thus, when material has been sufficiently overleamed with
respect to the recall criterion, recall scores may continue
for long periods of time near 100% correct levels. We
cannot demonstrate a classical retention curve by the re-
call measure for the words in the Lord's Prayer or the
National Anthem for most adult Americans. A somewhat
analogous situation may occur when performance on easy
recognition tests shows little or no decline for several days
after associations have been learned to the threshold of
anticipation. This does not serve as a valid basis for con-
tending, however, that recognition measures, per se, do
not yield classical, that is, negatively accelerated, reten-
tion curves (Bahrick 1964, p. 190).
The nondecline of recognition scores in the PARM
study therefore can be potentially explained in terms of
false ad noting by subjects and the use of easy recog-
nition tests that were not sensitive enough to reveal any
decline in memory over the short period (2 weeks) after
which memory was tested. Recognition memory for ad-
vertisements might indeed have a negative slope over
time if difficult recognition tests were employed that
provide better control of response biases and use a suf-
ficiently longer decay period.
The primary objective of our study was to examine
the characteristics of recognition decay as a funtion of
time. Two additional objectives were to compare for-
getting as measured by the discriminability and similar-
ity of recall and recognition and to compare the data with
those of the first study (Singh and Rothschild 1983a) to
draw conclusions about the value of recognition as a
measurement device for the study of the leaming and
forgetting of television commercials.
METHOD
To determine whether commercial recognition mem-
ory would decline with time if more appropriate condi-
tions were used, we conducted an experiment that re-
flected the aforementioned three variables. Subjects were
exposed to test conmiercials embedded in a television
news show and their recognition memory was tested af-
ter different delay periods. Rather than a yes/no test, a
forced-choice recognition test was used.^
Only two exposures of the test commercials were used
to avoid overleaming. Three test periods, 1 week, 3
weeks, and 6 weeks after exposure, were used to make
the recognition test discriminating enough for memory
loss to be revealed. Memory loss was tested for both 30-
second and 10-second spots. The study was a three time
periods ( 1 , 3 , and 6 weeks) by two lengths of commer-
cial (30- and 10-second) by two repetitions (1 and 2)
complete factorial design with multiple recall and rec-
ognition dependent variables.
Procedure
Two-hundred five (205) undergraduate student sub-
jects were assigned at random to the 12 experimental
cells. The videotapes were shown at three times—at 6,
3, and 1 week before the testing session. At each time,
subjects were assigned randomly to one of four 30-min-
ute videotapes. Viewing took place in small groups of 2
to 15 subjects. All post testing was done on a single day
to minimize possible contamination due to subject in-
teraction.
After being given instructions that indicated they would
later evaluate programming, subjects viewed excerpts of
three network affiliate news broadcasts. Subjects then were
asked to fill out an evaluation form comparing the news
from each of the three stations and were asked to come
back after 1, 3, or 6 weeks (depending on the experi-
mental condition to which they were assigned) to eval-
uate cable television news shows. This step was part of
the cover story to disguise the true purpose of the ex-
periment. At the second session, all subjects were given
an unaided recall test of commercials seen previously on
^In a forced-choice test, the subject is presented with two or more
advertisements at a time. Only one of the ads is the test ad (or stimulus
ad); the rest are bogus (or distractor) ads. The subject's task is to pick
out the test ad. Because he or she has no choice but to indicate one.
of the ads is the test ad, the test is called "forced choice." Forced-
choice tests are most appropriate in reducing response biases because
the subject cannot "please" the interviewer by picking any one of the
altematives. In other words, the tendency to say "yes" affects both
the stimulus and distractors alike and hence exerts little influence on
the observed choice (Shepard and Chang 1967).
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the videotape. Next, subjects received 9-altemative ver-
bal recognition tests of product, brand, and claim rec-
ognition.'
Stimulus materials: commercials. Three 30-second
predominantly informational commercials representing
three low involvement categories (trash bags, frozen pie,
and salad dressing) were selected. The conrniericals were
edited to create their 10-second versions. The selected
commercials and the brands represented in them were
novel to the subjects though the commercials were for
real brands that were distributed regionally in another
part of the United States.
Stimulus materials: overall videotape. Four 30-min-
ute tapes consisting of excerpts of news, weather, and
sports from network news shows in different parts of the
country were prepared with commercials embedded in
the program material in five places. The first two and
last two commercials on each tape were nonexperimental
fillers used to avoid primacy and recency effects among
the experimental commercials. No commercial was shown
twice in succession. On two tapes all experimental com-
mercials were 10 seconds long and on the other two tapes
all experimental commercials were 30 seconds long. Ex-
perimental commercials on tapes 1 and 3 were repeated
only once, whereas those on tapes 2 and 4 were repeated
twice. Hence, the four tapes captured the two lengths of
message (10-second and 30-second) by two repetition
levels (1 and 2) aspect of the design. All subjects saw
all three experimental commercials.
Dependent Variables
Each subject received an unaided recall test followed
by the 9-altemative verbal recognition tests."*
Recall test. Subjects were asked to recall the product
category, brand name, and claim(s) for as many of the
commercials shown to them in the earlier session as pos-
sible.'
Verbal recognition test. Nine-alternative verbal rec-
ognition tests were used for product category, brand name,
and claim recognition. Subjects first performed a prod-
uct category recognition test; next, they were told the
actual product category and were asked to pick the stim-
ulus brand name from the nine altematives. Subjects then
were given nine claims and were asked to select the cor-
rect claim for each brand. They were not told the correct
brand name prior to claim recognition.
RESULTS
Because the study was concemed with recall and rec-
ognition as tests of memory rather than the impact of
any specific commercial, the results are reported in terms
of each subject's aggregate score across commercials.
That is, each subject received a score of one for each
product, brand, and claim he or she correctly recalled or
recognized. Thus, a subject's score for each measure could
range from zero to three. An examination of the number
of products, brands, and/or claims recalled and recog-
nized indicates that the scores are correlated (see Table
1). This finding suggests that multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) is the appropriate analysis tech-
nique.
Recognition as a Function of the Passage of Time
One of the strongest criticisms of recognition has been
its lack of decay over time. Table 2 shows the multi-
variate and univariate ANOVA results assessing the im-
pact of time since exposure. The results indicate that the
passage of time affected recognition scores. The specific
impact of time since exposure on recognition can be seen
in Table 3. The general pattem is one of decay in rec-
ognition scores over time. Though the overall pattem of
'Whether recall testing prior to recognition testing affects the ob-
served recognition scores is not known. The psychology literature of-
fers conflicting evidence. Some studies show that prior recall does
influence subsequent recognition (Lockhart 1975; Postman, Jenkins,
and Postman 1948) and others indicate that prior recall has no effect
on subsequent recognition (Dallett, Wilcox, and D'Andrea 1968; Dar-
ley and Murdock 1971). We believe that prior recall did not affect
recognition scores in this study because Singh and Rothschild (1983b),
using forced-choice recognition tests, have shown that prior unaided
recall does not influence recognition testing for advertising stimuli.
'Recall and recognition are on a continuum of difficulty wherein
unaided recall is most difficult and yes/no recognition is most easy
in terms of subjects being able to respond to tests of leaming. On
such a continuum recall can be made easier by adding various cues
(aids) and recognition can be made more difficult by adding distrac-
tors and by making the distractors similar. By giving strong aids to
recall and putting large numbers of similar distractors in a recognition
test, one can shift recall and recognition measures along the contin-
uum. In the extreme case, Tulving and Thomson (1973) have shown
reversals so that material which is not recognizable can be recalled.
The recall test we used is more stringent than that commonly used in
industry, where aided recall typically is employed. It seems that the
results for recall would have been closer to those for recognition if
an aided recall test had been used to measure it.
'Though use of aided recall scores is the prevalent industry practice,
we chose to use unaided recall measures to keep our dependent vari-
ables consistent with those of Singh and Rothschild (1983a), as our
study was an extension of theirs.
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decay is strong, there are some minor reversals; for ex-
ample, recognition after a 3-week delay exceeds that af-
ter a 1-week delay. In general, though, the frequent crit-
icism that recognition is not susceptible to forgetting is
not supported.
Recognition as a Function of Message Length and
Repetition
The Singh and Rothschild (1983a) fmdings indicated
that message length and message repetition both can af-
fect recognition scores. Tests of these effects were rep-
licated in the current study; the same results hold in gen-
eral, though there are a few reversals.
Table 2 shows what happened to recognition as a
function of message length. Both the MANOVA and
ANOVA results show that message length had an impact
on recognition with one exception; product recognition
did not change when message length changed. This re-
sult is somewhat inconsistent with what was found in the
previous study, where message length did not affect brand
recognition significantly, but did affect product recog-
nition. Table 2 also shows the impact of repetition on
recognition. Both MANOVA and ANOVA yield the ex-
pected results. In sum, the earlier fmdings about the im-
pact of message length and message repetition on rec-
ognition are supported in the replication, with two
exceptions.
Recall as a Function of the Passage of Time, Message
Length, and Repetition
The results for recall are generally as expected. The
MANOVA results for message length are not statisti-
cally significant; the ANOVA results indicate that this
fmding is due to no effect for brand recall. All other
relations are statistically significant. The results of the
previous study, showing no main effect for length of
commercial on brand recall but a significant main effect
of length and repetition in all other cases, are replicated
perfectly.
Comparing Recall and Recognition
Two major factors to be considered in comparing re-
call and recognition are (1) which dependent variable is
more sensitive to the decay in memory over time and (2)
whether the two variables covary.
Sensitivity to memory. Recognition has been ma-
ligned for involving substantial ceiling effects and for
not being a discriminating measure between stimuli.
Shepard and Chang (1967) obtained 85 to 90% recog-
nition scores for stimulus items that had been viewed
several weeks prior to testing. However, Singh and
Rothschild (1983a) found that the difficult recognition
task led to a wide range of scores, a result that was rep-
licated in the current study.
RECOGNITION VERSUS RECALL
We defined a ceiling effect operationally as being
present whenever 15% or more of the subjects could rec-
ognize correctly all three of the relevant stimuli. Among
the 12 cells are six cells in which 15% or more of the
subjects could recognize all \!s\x&t. products. Four of these
ceiling effects occurred when subjects were exposed to
two repetitions of the ad and were asked for their rec-
ognition either 1 or 3 weeks later. There are no ceiling
effects for products when recognition was assessed after
6 weeks.
For brand, only one ceiling effect is found among the
12 cells; 15% of the subjects recognized all three brands
correctly when they saw two repetitions of the ad and
their recognition was assessed 1 week later. There are
three ceiling effects for claims. The total pattem of re-
sults seems to suggest that ceiling effects for recognition
scores as measured by a 9-item recognition task are not
as great a problem for ad testing as commonly has been
assumed.
Though recognition scores often have been criticized
for ceiling effects, little attention has been directed at
examining the behavior of recall scores. In a relatively
large number of cells, a large percentage of the subjects
could not recall any of the three products, brands, or
claims to which they had been exposed in the experi-
ment. The situation is just the opposite of that for which
recognition measures have been criticized. Consequently
a floor effect was defined as present whenever 85% or
more of the subjects could not recall any of the three
products, brands, or claims. The 85% figure was chosen
to keep the analysis symmetrical with respect to the op-
erational definition of ceiling effect.* Of the 12 cells, a
product floor effect is present in five, a brand floor ef-
fect is present in 10, and a claim floor effect is present
in nine. The conclusion certainly seems warranted that
the susceptibility of unaided recall scores to floor effects
is greater than the susceptibility of forced-choice rec-
ognition scores to ceiling effects.
Another perspective on the sensitivity of the two mea-
sures can be obtained by examining Table 3. The data
indicate that the mean level of recognition scores for each
treatment condition is uniformly higher than that of the
recall scores. More dramatically, the mean recognition
scores after a 3-week delay exceed the comparable recall
scores after a 1-week delay in every case, and the mean
recognition scores after a 6-week delay exceed the com-
parable recall scores after a 1- or 3-week delay in every
case. Similarly, mean levels of recognition are higher
than mean levels of recall when recognition is assessed
after one exposure and recall is measured after two ex-
'To be precise, the recognition scores should be corrected for guess-
ing. In a 9-altemative forced choice test this correction is up to 11%
(1 of 9), depending on the level of recognition scores. This analysis
is not reported because it did not affect a single result in the study.
Table 3















































































































































































































'The number of subjects in the cell is in parentheses.
''The standard deviations for the cells are in parentheses.
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posures; the results are the same with recognition scores
for 10-second commercials versus recall scores for 30-
second commercials. Clearly, recognition is more sen-
sitive to leaming (as shown in the 1983 study) and to
memory rentention over time. Though recall shows weak
leaming, recognition shows memory retention after six
weeks.
Related to the issue of whether there are ceiling or
floor effects is the question of the measure's ability to
discriminate among subjects in terms of their degree of
memory trace of the various commercials. Other things
being equal, a measure that shows wide rather than nar-
row variation across subjects is preferred because it is
capable of making finer distinctions. A measure that var-
ies within a narrow band conversely means that subjects
having different levels of a memory trace for a com-
mercial would necessarily be judged as having equal lev-
els because of the crude categorization afforded by the
scale.
The standard deviation was used to assess the discrim-
inability of the measures; the standard deviations by cell
are reported in parentheses in Table 3. Note that for cell
3 the standard deviation of the product recall scores is
zero, because none of the subjects could recall seeing
any of the three ads. The same was true in six of the
cells when subjects were asked to recall brands and in
three of the cells when they were asked to recall claims.
In contrast, when recognition was assessed, some sub-
jects were always able to recognize at least one of the
ads to which they had been exposed.
Table 3 indicates there are very few cells in which the
recall scores show more variability than the recognition
scores; more specifically, recall scores were more vari-
able in only two of the 12 cells when product memory
was being assessed, in no cells when brand memory was
being assessed, and in only one cell when claim memory
was being measured. If we ignore the cells in which there
is no variance in the recall scores, the results suggest
that the average ratio of variability of the recognition
scores to variability ofthe recall scores is 1.78 for prod-
uct, 2.55 for brand, and 1.88 for claim. These ratios
understate the true ratios of variation in the two sets of
scores because of the necessity of ignoring those cells in
which the ratios are infinite. The evidence clearly dem-
onstrates that recognition scores show more variability
across subjects than do recall scores, which in tum sug-
gests that they afford finer distinctions among subjects.
Concommitant variation of recall and recognition.
The two sets of dependent variables behave similarly in
terms of the overall pattem of the results. Spearman's
rank order correlation coefficient, for example, indicates
that when the 12 cell means are ordered from largest to
smallest the rank order correlation between the product
recall and recognition means is .89 (p < .05), whereas
that between the brand recall and recognition means is
.30 (n.s.) and that between the claim recall and recog-
nition means is .61 (p < .05). Particularly for product,
then, but also somewhat for claim, the conclusions would
be very similar for the differential impact on memory of
two repetitions versus one and 30-second versus 10-sec-
ond exposures regardless of whether subjects' knowl-
edge trace is assessed by using recognition or recall. There
would be differences in the conclusions about the amount
of knowledge subjects had about the products and claims
in the commercials when knowledge is assessed by rec-
ognition versus recall even though the pattem of effects
is similar. One reason for the low correlation between
the ranked recall and recognition scores is the low levels
of brand recall by cell. The low scores produce only small
differences across cells, which in tum generate only a
weak ordering of the cells. This finding represents a weak
replication of the 1983 finding that all three rank order
correlations were significant (p < .05).
DISCUSSION
Recognition measures have been used routinely to as-
certain the memory effectiveness of print advertise-
ments, but in the past few years researchers have begun
to believe that recognition measures should have a greater
role in broadcast advertising. For example, many re-
searchers have advocated employing recognition mea-
sures for measuring memory effects of television com-
mercials for low involvement products (Bettman 1979;
Krugman 1972, 1985; Singh and Rothschild 1983a). Also,
dissatisfaction with the currently used yes/no recogni-
tion tests seems to be increasing (Singh and Cole 1985).
There is a special concem with the response set bias in
such tests, which tends to artificially infiate the recog-
nition scores.
Our findings and those of Singh and Rothschild (1983a)
show clearly that regulation tests need not have indis-
criminately high scores, especially if difficult recogni-
tion tests that are less sensitive to subjects' response biases
are used and memory is tested after longer intervals. Given
that the recognition test used was relatively free of re-
sponse biases, a nondecline in recognition scores implies
that the material being tested has been overleamed for
the test being used. One can be reasonably sure that the
test is relatively bias free when a 9-altemative forced-
choice test is used.
The critical issues for advertising are:
—What amount of leaming is adequate? That is, what actual
memory threshold level is sufficient?
—Which measure of memory is best under particular cir-
cumstances?
In certain low involvement situations where brand
choice decisions are made inside the store, a level of
leaming as indicated by recognition may be sufficient
(Bettman 1979). However, even in such situations, many
advertisers tend to rely heavily on recall instead of rec-
ognition measures.
The issue of which measure of memory is appropriate
is important because use of recognition rather than recall
may justify lower advertising budgets; a given level of
recognition (say 60%) may be reached with far fewer
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exposures of an ad than would be necessary if one wanted
to achieve the same level of recall. Notice that the actual
level of memory for a stimulus is constant at a specific
time in a particular respondent's mind; it is the response
to the measure (recognition or recall) being used to as-
sess memory that varies.
Managers may be overspending substantially as a re-
sult of using recall instead of recognition measures. Re-
call measures seem to understate significantly the true
remembrance of advertising in general (Krugman 1972)
and of emotional or mood ads in particular (Zielske 1982).
Moreover, once the advertising stops, memory as mea-
sured by unaided recall declines sharply (Zielski and Henry
1980). In contrast, memory for advertisements declines
more slowly when recognition is used to assess it.
The Decay of Memory
Though our findings indicate that recognition memory
does decay over time, as had been shown previously in
recall tests, strong memory traces remain after long pe-
riods of time and after very weak exposure to stimuli.
With moderately weak stimulus (two exposures to two
30-second commercials), almost half of the products and
brands and more than one third of the claims could be
recognized 6 weeks after exposure. In comparison with
actual media schedules, this level of exposure can be
labeled "moderately weak." Even with the weakest stim-
ulus (one exposure to a 10-second commercial), from
one quarter to almost one third of the products, brands,
and claims were recognized after 6 weeks.'
This demonstration of the power of the human mind
to retain relatively inconsequential material is important
for advertisers who previously have been shown, via re-
call, that memory was much weaker. This finding should
be useful to members of the Advertising Age Sounding
Board (Zeltner 1986), who believed that controlling ex-
penditures was the most pressing advertising problem of
the late 1980s.
If a recognition level of memory is sufficient to make
in-store brand choice decisions (as suggested by Bettman
1979), our findings may be useful to advertisers seeking
justification for budget cuts. Memory traces seem to be
very long lasting and provide a rationale for more eco-
nomical fiighting schedules.
CONCLUSION
For recognition to be accepted as widely as recall in
the assessment of broadcast advertising, it should have
certain desirable qualities. It should be sensitive and dis-
criminating, and should measure accurately what is
thought to be stored in memory. Our findings and those
of Singh and Rothschild (1983a) show that recognition
has such qualities.
'Our audience was educated and captive. In addition, the exposure
situation involved less clutter than actual TV viewing. Both of these
factors might have inflated nnemory scores over what might typically
be found in practice.
Recognition seems to be more sensitive than recall. It
is able to show memory traces that cannot be seen via
recall. Across all cells of the experiment, average rec-
ognition is 1.340 items (of three stimulus items) whereas
for recall the average is .213 items. In addition, there
are 10 cells in which no memory could be measured us-
ing recall; the average recognition value is 1.140 items
in those cells.
Recognition also seems to be more discriminating. One
virtue of a measure is its ability to separate objects on
the basis of certain criteria; a key criterion of this ability
is the variance obtained across objects on the measure.
The variance of recognition is approximately twice that
of recall in our study; even this large difference is an
understatement, for it does not account for the fact that
more than one fourth of the recall cells were not included
in the analysis because there was no recall to assess.
Even though recognition is clearly different from re-
call in some ways, the two measures seem to covary. In
the experiment reported here and in the prior one, the
rank order correlation of cells across the two measures
is high and is statistically significant in five of six cases.
Given two measures of some unknown level of mem-
ory, which is more appropriate? A measure can under-
state reality by being insensitive or can overstate it by
allowing false positive responses. Recognition may al-
low false positive responses, but with a 9-altemative test
the upper limit of guessing correctly is 11%. Reducing
recognition scores by this amount does not greatly alter
the differences between the two measures, but rather
strengthens the argument that recognition, if properly used,
is a good measure of memory.
Whether one uses recognition or recall as a measure
of leaming should depend on several factors, including
the product type (low vs. high involvement) and place
of decision maQcing (in store vs. at home). It also should
depend on management's objectives. Managers might
prefer a recall level of leaming simply because it implies
a stronger memory trace for what the advertiser would
like consumers to believe about its brand. In this case
the information would be readily accessible in a search
of memory and an extemal stimulus would not be nec-
essary to trigger the associations.
Nevertheless, a general conclusion from our study
seems warranted: advertisers who in the past have trusted
recall as a measure of memory can also have faith in
recognition. It is sensitive and discriminating and shows
memory loss over time.
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